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Harvesters:
Alternatives to Judicial Intervention
in Medical Treatment Decisions
Karen A. Butler'

I. INTRODUCTION
The tragic scene is played out in critical care units across the country: a
loved one suffers a tragic stroke; a young mother sustains a devastating head
injury in a motor vehicle accident; an infant is born with part of a brain. These
scenes result in various approaches: the family wants nothing done, the doctor
wants to pull out all the stops; the doctor wants to let the person go and the family
wants "everything" done; the family and the physician agree to let Dad die with
dignity only to have a hospital administrator intervene.
The twentieth century has seen an explosion in medical technology.' One
need no longer breath to receive oxygen; one need no longer eat to receive
sustenance; one need no longer think to be "alive".2 With this technology has
come fear.' People fear a life in limbo, kept alive by machine, unable to interact
with our environment, nearly as much or more so than people fear death itself.4
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of a competent,
non-pregnant adult to refuse life sustaining treatment.5 Unfortunately, when the
time comes to make these decisions, many people lack the capacity to do so.6 It
is in this situation that many families and/or physicians turn to the courts for
help.7
* The author is an associate of the law firm of Thuillez, Ford, Gold, & Conolly, LLP, in Albany,
New York and a member of the Saratoga Hospital Ethics Committee. The author would like to thank
her parents for their encouragement and support.
1. Linda C. Fentiman, Privacy and Personhood Revisited: A Framewor*for Substitute
Decisionmakingfor the Incompetent, Incurably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH L. REV. 801, 802 (1989);
Hospitalized
Support Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Carefor Seriously 11M
Patients, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995) (hereinafter "Support").
2. David K. P. Lee, M.D. et al., Withdrawing Care:Erperiencein a MedicalIntensive CareUnit,
271 JAMA 1358, 1359 (1994).
3.

Fentiman, supra note 1, at 802, 804. See also Support, supra note 1, at 1591.

4. Id.
5. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). "[A] competent person has
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment .. ." Id But see
Alicia Ouellette, Comment, NewMedical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine Court-OrderedMedical

ProceduresDuring Pregnancy,57 ALB. L. REV. 927, 953 (1994) (discussing the compromise of the
constitutionally protected rights of pregnant women to refuse even major surgical procedures which
may benefit the fetus).
6. Fentiman, supra note 1, at 803.
7.

Id. at 828.
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In the past, judicial intervention in decisions to withdraw life support and/or
withhold treatment for an incompetent patient was virtually unknown. 8 These
decisions were made privately, by the patient's family and physician. 9 Although
to a large extent the same is true today, in the past twenty-five years more
physicians and families have sought judicial intervention when conflicts arise
concerning the treatment decisions for an incompetent patient) ° It is difficult to
imagine a more personal and heart wrenching decision than allowing a loved one
to die.' Yet not only is judicial intervention cumbersome, expensive, and time
consuming, it intrudes into the lives of patients and their families during a
particularly emotional and upsetting time." In addition, few judges possess the
clinical expertise to decide issues involving complex medical data."3 Similarly,
judges are not familiar with the patient's values, goals, preferences or religious
beliefs. 4 Clearly, the courtroom is the least desirable forum for determining
these issues. 5
Various models of dispute resolution have been proposed as alternatives to
judicial intervention in making medical decisions for the incompetent adult.'6
These models include forms of mediation as well as arbitration utilizing ethics
committees and/or ethical consultants." This article will examine the problem
of maldng medical decisions for those who cannot decide for themselves. Current
models of decision making will be examined as well as various proposals for
alternative dispute resolution. A proposed New York model will be examined in
detail. As America enters the twenty-first century, it is imperative that its citizens
formulate mechanisms of dispute resolution that protect the rights of the
incompetent patients to dignity and autonomy when such persons are seriously ill
and unable to decide for themselves. Alternative forms of dispute resolution may
be superior to judicial intervention in meeting the needs of these persons.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 807.
10. Id.
11. Michele Yuen, Comment, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standards for Surrogate
Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L REV. 581, 582 (1992).
12. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 449 (N.J. 1987).
13. Yuen, supra note 11, at 605.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 610.
16. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,668 (N.J. 1976) (discussing ethics committees); Jobes, 529 A.2d
at 463 (discussing ethics committees); John LaPuma, M.D. & Stephen E. Toulmin, Ethics Consultants
andEthics Committees, 149 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1109 (1989) (comparing ethics committees and
consultants and suggesting that consultants should mediate disputes while committees should
promulgate institutional policy); Yuen, supra note 11, at 627 (proposing arbitration to resolve disputes
regarding medical decision making); Fentiman, supranote 1, at 841 (proposing a mediation model of
dispute resolution to resolve these disputes).
17. See supra note 16.
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II. THE PROBLEM

A. Medical Intervention
Death comes to everyone. To a few, it comes suddenly and completely
unexpectedly,but to most, it follows an opportunity for leave-takingand
for directing, to some extent, the mode and timing of death. Virtually
all people who die in this country will have been under treatment by
health care professionals who have, especially in the last four decades,
developed powerful means to forestall death. This power is so dramatic
that sometimes it seems that medicine aims first and foremost to
conquer death. Physicians realize, of course, that the mission of
vanquishing death is finally futile, but often they and their patients are
quite determined to do all that is possible to postpone the event.
Sometimes this objective so dominates care that patients undergo

therapies whose effects do not actually advance their own goals and
values. Specifically, the drive to sustain life can conflict with another
fundamental (and arguably more venerable) objective of medicine -- the
relief of suffering. Physicians and others who establish health care
policies and practices have come to realize that the attempt to postpone
death should at times yield to other more important goals of patients.' 8
Americans have developed into a complex, technologically advanced
society.' 9 Nowhere is the complexity of human existence or the pervasiveness
of technology into everyday lives as evident as in medicine.2" Medical
procedures and equipment can work modem day miracles to snatch, at least
temporarily, the dying from the jaws of death.2 However, modem technology
often serves not to prolong life, but only to prolong death. Death may be held at
bay by a dizzying array of medical weaponry including ventilators, dialysis
machines, drugs, transplants, artificial hydration and artificial nutrition.22 This
of life in limbo, neither dead nor capable of interacting with one's
raises an image
23
environment.

18.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FO THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS INMEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL

& BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,

DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 15-16 (1983)

(hereinafter COMMN REPORT).
19. Fentiman, supra note 1, at 801.
20. Id. at 802.'
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. In 1986 it was estimated that five to ten thousand persons in the United States "lived" in
a persistent vegetative (permanently unconscious) state. Lynne Sims-Taylor, Reasoned Compassion
in a More Humane Forum: A Proposal to Use ADR to Resolve Medical Treatment Decisions, 9 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL 333 n.213 (1994).
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The decision to accept or forego medical treatment is a deeply personal one
based on a person's own religious, ethical, and philosophical values.24 In a
recent survey, eighty-four percent of Americans stated that they would want life
support withdrawn if there was no hope of survival.2" However, decisions
regarding any medical intervention are always contextual.26 Healthy persons
frequently express the feeling that they would not want to live with a severe
disability.27 However, when faced with a disabling illness or injury, people will
often accept even the most aggressive treatment, frequently going on to lead
productive and rewarding lives. 28 What appears to be an intolerable burden to
may seem like a reasonable accommodation to a disabled
a healthy person
29
individual.
For instance, consider the case of Stephen Hawking, the renown physicist and
Cambridge's Lucasian Chair of Mathematics.3" Hawking, forty-nine, is afflicted
with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis ("ALS") or Lou Gehrig's disease, an incurable
disease of the central nervous system that has rendered him paralyzed, wheelchair
bound and unable to communicate without the help of a computerized
synthesizer. 3' However, Mr. Hawking credits his disability with focusing his
energies on theoretical physics and allowing him to develop the science of
cosmology, the study of the nature of the universe and the unity of space and
time. 2 With the help of medical technology, Stephen Hawking has contributed
to our knowledge of the universe and of ourselves and continues to be a source of
inspiration for the disabled.
B. The Right to Choose
Nonpregnant adults, with capacity, have a firmly established right to accept
or reject medical treatment.3" "[Elvery individual of sound mind and adult years

24.

NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE:

DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WImouT CAPACITY 47 (1992) (hereinafter "TASK FORCE").

25. Sims-Taylor, supra, note 23, at 333.
26. Yuen, supra note 11, at 607.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. See also Marion Danis et al., Patients' andFamilies'Preferencesfor Medical Intensive
Care,260 JAMA 797, 799 (1988) (stating seventy-four percent of patients treated in ICU would repeat
the experience even if it meant only one more month of life).
30. Stephen Hawking, Is the End in Sight for TheoreticalPhysics, in BLACK HOLES AND BABY
UNIvERsES AND OTnER ESSAYS 49 (1993).
31. Id. at 25.
32. Id. at 22-23.
33. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. (stating that the right to refuse treatment is a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest). However, the rights of pregnant women to refuse even invasive
procedures is far from absolute. See Ouellette, supra note 5, for a discussion of the rights of women
to refuse treatment intended to benefit the fetus. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope
of this article.
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has a right to determine what should be done with his own body .... .04 People
have the right to refuse even life-saving treatments that are minimally invasive and
which pose negligible risk." Patients' right to determine their own medical
treatment prevails over the state's interests in preserving life, preventing suicide,
protecting third persons (for example, dependent children) and preserving the
integrity of the medical profession.36 Problems arise, however, when patients are
without the capacity to make these treatment decisions for themselves.
C. Medical Decisionsfor Patients Without Capacity
The determination of patient "incapacity" - i.e., the patient's inability to
make an informed decision about healthcare - has critical implications.
Patients with capacity have the right to control the course of their
medical treatment. Patient's who lack capacity cannot exercise this
authority. Their decision-maldng rights exist only to the extent that
others are obligated to honor their previously expressed wishes."
At the patient's bedside, the physician usually determines if the patient has
the capacity to consent to treatment.3 " The physician often turns to the patient's
family for assistance in determining health care issues.39 As long as the patient
voices no objection, no judicial determination of incapacity is necessary.4 Only
a judicial determination of incapacity can remove the patient's right to object to
medical treatment.41
The problems arise when patients, without capacity, require treatment that,
for some reason, the doctor or family believes they might have refused if they had
capacity. States have enacted legislation permitting patients to retain some control
over health care decisions after they have lost the capacity to do so. 42 These
advance directives fall generally into two types of instruments; the "living will"
and the "health care proxy."

34. Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
35. The Court in Cruzan made no distinction between artificial nutrition and hydration and other
more invasive or heroic medical procedures. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261. See also In re Convoy, 486
A.2d 1209, 1236 (N.J. 1985) (nutrition and hydration no different from more aggressive treatments);
Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218 (N.Y. 1990) (patient had the right to refuse blood transfusions
even though to do so could cause her death).
36. TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 25.
37. Id. at 27-28.
38. Id. "Capacity" is a limited and specific determination that a person lacks the ability to make
a particular decision at a particular point in time. Id. at 83. Conversely, "competence" is a broader,
judicial determination, that a person lacks the ability to make all decisions for himself. Id. A detailed
discussion of the standards to determine "capacity" and/or "competence" is beyond the scope of this
article. See id. at 83-92 for a detailed discussion of the tests for competency and capacity.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 28.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 29.
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1. Living Wills
Living wills were originally proposed by Doctor Louis Kutner in the 1960's
4
and were popularized by such groups as the Society for the Right to Die.
44
A typical statute allows
Thirty-eight states have enacted living will statutes.
competent adults to execute a document, witnessed by two disinterested persons,
which provides that, should the person become incapacitated and incurably,
terminally ill sustained only by "life support," they wish to receive no medical
treatment.45 Potential patients can specify exactly what treatments they wish to
receive and what treatment they do not want.46
Living wills have been criticized as inadequate to achieve the goal of
personal autonomy in medical decision making.4 7 A person may be "incurably"
ill without being "terminally" ill (i.e., a person in a persistent vegetative state).48
Many statutes hold that the living will is not effective unless the person is
terminally ill, death is imminent, or the document is drafted in vague terms such
as "life-sustaining" treatments. In addition, living wills are specific and
inflexible.49 A person executing a living will cannot possibly predict the
circumstances in which these decisions will be made or which decisions will be
perfectly reasonable or which absurd."0 These decisions will be largely
contextual, depending on the type of treatment, illness and incompetency
involved. 5 For this reason, many states have instead legislated the designation
of a health care proxy to make decisions for a patient that has become
incapacitated. 5
2. Health Care Proxy
Thirteen states, including New York, have enacted statutes allowing people
to designate surrogate decisionmakers in the event they become incapacitated."
The designated person makes health care decisions in accordancewith the patient's
known wishes, or if these wishes are unknown, in accordance with what the proxy
believes the patient would have wanted. 4 In New York, the surrogate may make
decisions regarding artificial nutrition and hydration only if these wishes are

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Fentiman, supra note 1, at 818.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 826.
Id.; N.Y. PUB. HEALI LAW § 29-C (McKinney Supp. 1992).
TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 33.
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known." Health care professionals must honor the decisions of surrogates as if
they were the decisions of patients themselves and are protected from liability for
doing so.56 The designation of a surrogate decisionmaker, unlike a living will,
allows health care decisions to be made in the context of intelligent, informed
consultation with the health care team in consideration of the patient's beliefs and
values." This flexible approach is clearly superior to the living wills method of
advance directive.
Unfortunately, only nine to fifteen percent of the population have executed
any type of advance directive.5" Congress has recognized the utility of advance

directives to facilitate decision making for the incapacitated patient.59 In an
attempt to encourage the use of such directives, Congress passed the Patient Self
Determination Act ("PSDA"). 6°
3. The Patient Self Determination Act
To promote the execution of advance directives, Congress passed the
PSDA. 6 1 The PSDA applies to all health-care facilities receiving reimbursement
under Medicare Part A._2 This includes most hospitals, nursing homes, hospice
programs and HMO's.63 The PSDA provides that patients must be informed, in
writing, .of their right to execute an advance directive under their state law as well
as the institution's policy on implementation of the directive. 64 Any advance
directive must be documented in the patient's medical record.65 Though the
PSDA is a step in the right direction, unfortunately, it can be anticipated that most
adults will still fail to execute an advance directive. Therefore, it is imperative to
determine what processes can best be used to resolve disputes arising when the
patient has no advance directive and is without capacity to make his own health
care decisions.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Fentiman, supra note 1, at 828.

58.

136 CONG. REC. E943-01 (daily ed. April 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Levin).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (West Supp. 1991).
Id
Id.
Yuen, supra note 11, at 592.
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1XA) (West Supp. 1991).
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1991).
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III. STANDING FOR SURROGATE DECISION MAKING

There are, traditionally, two standards for making medical treatment decisions
66 These are the "substituted
for those persons who cannot decide for themselves.
67
standards.
interests"
judgment" and "best
A. Substitute Judgment
Surrogates, utilizing the "substituted judgment" standard, attempt to
extrapolate what patients would have decided about a specific medical treatment,
if they had the capacity to do so, from any evidence indicating the wishes of6
patients regarding medical decisions expressed before patients lost capacity. 1
Ideally, surrogates are people in a position to know patients, their philosophies,
values, ethics, religious beliefs and feelings regarding these decisions.69 Whether
to refuse or allow a specific treatment will depend on the decisionmaker's
interpretation of the evidence.70 The decisionmakers attempt to "stand in the
shoes" of patients and decide as they would have decided.7' This evaluation will,
necessarily, be colored by decisionmakers' own values, beliefs and even conflicts
of interest with the patient.72 The evidence of the patient's wishes may fall far
short of the types of evidence found in an advance directive."
Substituted judgment has been allowed in some jurisdictions even when the
patient has not clearly expressed any feelings regarding medical decisions, since
it is felt that the surrogate is in a position to intuitively sense what the patient
would have wanted.74 "A parent may understand a child's values because she
helped to form them, a child may grasp a parent's values because the parent
imparted them to her, and a couple may have developed and refined their views
in tandem. 7 5 For example, New Jersey utilized the substituted judgment
standard in the case of Nancy Jobes, a thirty-one year old woman who, as the
result of a motor vehicle accident, was in a persistent vegetative state.76 Mrs.
Jobes was fed through a "j-tube", a tube surgically inserted into the abdomen
through which she received liquified feedings.77 Mrs. Jobes' husband sought to

66. Diane E. Hoffmann, Regulating Ethics Committees in Health Care Institutions -- Is it Time,
50 MD.L REV. 746, 772 (1991).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Fentiman, supra note 1, at 848 n.55.
72. Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 773.
73. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 446.
74. Id. at 436.
75. Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L REV. 375, 438-39 (1989).
76. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 436.
77. Id. at 437.
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have the tube removed.78 The court found that, though Jobes had made some
casual references indicating that she did not want to be kept alive like Karen A.
Quinlan," Nancy Jobes had left no clear evidence of her desires in such a
situation.80 Never-the-less, the court held that in the absence of evidence of the
patient's wishes, the family could still exercise substitute judgment.8
[Flamily members are best suited to make substituted judgments for
incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of the
patient's approach to life, but also because of their bonds with him or
her. Our common experience informs us that family members are
generally most concerned with the welfare of the patient.82
The New York view was expressed by the court of appeals in In Re
Westchester County Medical Center,' where the court rejected the substitute
judgment doctrine and declined to allow withdrawal of a feeding tube absent clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.' The court held that, for a
decision maker to assert the right to forego life-saving treatment on behalf of an
incompetent patient, the decision maker must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the incompetent person, while competent, held a firm and settled
commitment to terminate treatment under these or similar circumstances. 5 The
United States Supreme Court has held that a requirement of clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's wishes before making health care decisions is
constitutional.8 6
Where the patient has expressed no preference regarding health care decisions
or has never been competent to make these types of decisions, substitute decision
making is inappropriate.8 7

78. Id.
79. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) Ms. Quinlan was a young woman who, for
reasons unknown, stopped breathing and, after resuscitation, was in a persistent vegetative state. Id.
Ms. Quinlan's father successfully sought judicial intervention to withdraw the ventilator which kept
her alive. Id. at 663 -64.
80. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 442-43.
81. Id. at 445.
82. Id.
83. 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
97. Tk.K FoacRC supra note 24, at 55. See also In Re Storar, 420 N.E.,d 64 (N.Y.), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). InStorar, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether a mother
could refuse blood transfusions on behalf of her son, a profoundly retarded man who never had the
capacity to make health care decisions for himself. Id. at 66. In deciding that the mother could not
make this decision, the court observed that substitute decision making in this case offered little
guidance. Id. at 72-73. To attempt to make such a determination would be "similar to asking whether
if it snowed all summer would it then be winter?" Id.
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B. Best Interest
Where substitute decisionmaling relies on a subjective analysis of what the

patient would have decided, best interest analysis focuses to a greater extent on an
objective assessment of what is in the best interest of the patient8s The best
interest analysis focuses not on what course of treatment this patient would have
chosen, but what a reasonable person in the patient's position would decide.'
In reaching a determination, the surrogate must weigh the burdens and benefits of
treatment and imagine what a hypothetical reasonable person in the context of the
patient's particular circumstances would decide.9 The surrogate should consider:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the dignity and uniqueness of every person;
the possibility of extending or preserving the patient's life;
the extent of restoration and improvement of the patient's health;
relief of suffering;
anything else that a reasonable person in the patient's condition would
consider in reaching their decision."1

The quality of a life, if prolonged, should be considered to a very limited
extent.' Only when the prolonging of life will result in an existence of pain and
93
suffering or in a permanently unconscious state should quality be considered.
It is important that decisionmakers do not instill into the process their own biases
about physical or mental disability.94 HpIman beings are enormously adaptable
and even persons with profound disabilities report a broad range of experiences
and possibilities.9 5

88. TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 55.
89. Id.
90. ld
91. Id at 114.
Caringfor Gravely IIl Children, 94 PEDIATRICS 433, 435
92. Alan R Fleischman, M.D. et al.,
(1994). See also, Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death andIncompetent Patients:Conceptuallnfirmidesand
Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARZ. L. REV. 373, 379 (1986) ("[Pleople experiencing various life
events, including set backs in their physical and mental functioning may revise their goals, values and
definitions of personal well-being."); see also, Brophy v. New England Sinai Hasp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d
626 (Mass. 1986). "[W]e must recognize that the State's interest in life encompasses a broader interest
than mere corporeal existence. In certain, thankfully rare, circumstances the burden of maintaining the
Id. at 635 (allowing
corporeal existence degrades the very humanity it was meant to serve .
withdrawal of a feeding tube in a patient in a persistent vegetative state).
93. Fleischman, supra note 92, at 435.
94. Id
95. Id See also HAwKNGo, supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the life of
Stephen Hawking).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1996/iss1/11

10

19961

Butler: Butler: Harvesters: Alternatives to Judicial Intervention
Alternatives to JudicialIntervention
C. Risks of ErroneousDecision Making

The decision to withhold life sustaining treatment is usually irrevocable.96
Therefore, the fear of making the wrong decision is justified. 97 Erroneous
decisionmaking originates with one or more of the following errors in the
decisionmaking process:
1.
2.
3.

mistaken diagnosis;
mistaken prognosis;
mistaken assessment of the patient's treatment wishes in a substituted
judgment analysis. 98

There is, at least, a minimal risk of a medical error in diagnosis or
prognosis. 99 However, the area where the risk of error is greatest is in assessing
the patient's own wishes.'
Several studies have attempted to examine the accuracy of surrogate
decisionmaker's predictions of what health care decisions a person would
make. 10 1 In one study, the physician's predictions of their own patient's
preferences were better than chance alone in only one out of six instances."
Chillingly, most doctors predicted that their patients would wish to forego
treatment when, in fact, the patient would have chosen aggressive medical
intervention."0 3 Spouses fared somewhat better, choosing better than chance
alone three out of six times. 0 4 Unlike doctors, spouses were more likely to err
on the side of aggressive treatment.'0 5 Most significantly, both spouses and
doctors were more than ninety0percent
likely to choose for the patient what they
6
would choose for themselves.

96. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 2, at 1359. In a study of twenty-eight patients who had life
sustaining treatments withdrawn, fourteen died within twenty-four hours, seven died within days one
and seven, and seven survived more than one week. Id. Furthermore, only four patients were
eventually discharged from the hospital. Id.
97. See Fentirnan, supra note 1, at 808.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 6-7.
102. Id at7.
103. Id But see Support, supranote 1, at 1594-95 (in a study of 4,301 patients only 47% of
physicians were aware that their patients preferred to avoid CPR and half of the patients who were able
to communicate in their last few days spent most of that time in severe to moderate pain); Bernard Lo,
M.D., Improving Care Near the End ofLife - Why is it so Hard?, 274 JAMA 1634, 1635 (1995) (Dr.
Lo theorizes that practitioners project their own concept of a "good death" on their patients).
104. TASK FoRCE, supra note 24, at 6-7.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 7 n.6. See also Lo, supra note 103, at 1635. At the very least, these studies
underscore the need to initiate some kind of advance directive to assist the surrogate in making these
determinations.
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In addition to inserting their own values, however unconsciously, into the
decisionmaking process, surrogates may also wish to see the patient dead, either
07
For
because of dislike, avarice or to limit the drain on available resources.
instance, a physician's determination that a patient would want life-support
Also,
withdrawn may reflect his own desire to free an intensive care unit b&dd.'
a family may want to limit the economic and emotional expense of maintaining
a loved one on life-support. 0 9
Regardless of who the surrogate is, the dangers of erroneous decisionmaking
exist."' When the physician and family cannot decide on the correct course of
treatment, at least one party has misinterpreted the evidence of what the patient
would want or what treatment is in the patient's best interest."' At this time,
it is advantageous for the parties to look to a neutral decisionmaker who has the
skills to facilitate the decision making process, protect the rights of the patient and
provide a forum for each side to justify their views. This article addresses various
mechanisms for review of these life-and-death decisions.

IV. WHo SHOULD DEcIDE WHEN THE PATIENT CANNOT

A. JudicialDetermination
As medical technology progressed to the point where persons could be kept
alive for an indefinite period, courts were forced to forge principles for reasoned
decisionmaking in an area where there were no clear answers in existing common
law."' "[The radical advances in life sustaining equipment and procedures
developed by the medical profession in the last twenty years have taxed the
3
The
common law process in ways that it has never been tested before. ''"
4
In Massachusetts, the
decisions from the state courts have been diverse.
supreme court purported to require judicial review whenever a decision was made
to withdraw life-support from an incompetent patient.' 5 The court explicitly
rejected any nonjudicial determination of the appropriate action by physicians or
ethics committees:

107. Fentiman, supra note 1, at 810.
108. Id. at 811. See also, e.g., Lee, supra note 2, at 1360 ("[Olnce life sustaining interventions
were withdrawn, most patients were soon transferred to general medical floors,").
109. Fentiman, supra note 1, at 811. See also Yuen, supranote 11, at 588 (noting that it is not
uncommon for families to be forced to sell their homes in order to maintain a family member on lifesupport for an extended period).
110. See Fentiman, supra note 1,at 812.
111. Yuen, supra note 11, at 629-30.
112. See Sol Wachtler, Life andDeath Decisions: The Patient's Choice, 205 N.Y.L.J. 39 (1991).
113. Id
114. Id.
115. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433 (Mass. 1977).
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We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decisionmaking
responsibility away from the duly established courts of proper
jurisdiction to any committee, panel, or group, ad hoc or permanent.
Thus, we reject the approach adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in the Quinlan case of entrusting the decision whether to continue
guardian, family, attending doctors,
artificial life support to the patient's
11 6
and hospital "ethics committee.
The Saikewitz court noted that "such questions of life and death ... require
the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the
ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created.""1 7 The
advantages of the judicial system in rendering these decisions have been identified
as:
1. public nature of the proceedings;
2. principled decisionmaking;
3. reviewability by appellate courts, legislatures and legal
commentators;
4. impartiality of courts;
5. developed body of common law;
6. adversarial nature of proceedings;
7. availability
of tools, such as guardianship, to protect the rights of the
8
patient.11
Unfortunately, some factors which the Saikewicz court held as benefits to the
judicial system are actually detrimental in these cases. For example, the openness
of the judicial process exposes what inherently should be private matters to public,
even media-style scrutiny.11 9 In addition, the judicial system is expensive,
bureaucratic and time consuming. 2 Frequently, the decisions are announced
months after the patient has either died or left the hospital.1 21 In response to
these concerns, the New Jersey Supreme Court, as early as 1976, suggested that
a more appropriate forum for review of these decisions was a hospital-based ethics
committee.' 22

116. Id. at 434 (citing Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671).
117. Id at 435.
600
.
118. Yuen, supra note 11, at
119. COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 18, at 159.
120. Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 780.
121. Id
122. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 668. The Quinlancase represented the firstjudicial review of a "right
to die" decision. SusanM. Wolf, Ethics Committees andDueProcess: Nesting Rights in a Community
of Caring, 50 MD. L. REV. 798 (1991).
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B. Ethics Committees
1. History
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan, relying on an article by Dr.
Karen Teel, suggested that healthcare decisionmaking was better facilitated in a
hospital based ethics committee than in a judicial forum.' The Quinlan court
recommended that if an ethics committee determined that "there [was] no

reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from her present comatose state
to a cognitive, sapient state," life-support could be withdrawn without judicial
intervention.124 In 1982, it was estimated that approximately one percent of
American hospitals had an ethics committee.25 Since that time, the number of
ethics committees has exploded.1 26 In 1991, the majority of hospitals reported
To a lesser extent, long-term care facilities have
having ethics committees.'
also begun to establish ethics committees. 28 Support for the ethics committee
movement include legislativeproposals,judicial decisions encouraging committees,
legal and medical commentary, federal guidelines regarding decisionmaking in
infant cases as well as a Presidential commission report released in 193.129
2. Composition
The composition of ethics committees is interdisciplinary and may include
physicians, social workers, nurses, hospital administrators, clergy, lawyers and
ethicists. 30 The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law recommends
that mandatory membership should include at least five individuals consisting of
at least one physician, one nurse, one social worker, one bioethicist and one lay
member of the community not affiliated with the hospital.' 3 Other suggested

123.

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Dr. Karen Teel, The Physician'sDilemma: A Doctor's

View: What the Law Should Be?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 6, 9 (1975)).
124. Id. at 671.
125. Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 797 n.3.
126. TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 17.
127. Wolf, supra note 122, at 799. For example, a 1988 survey of New York hospitals showed
that 51% of responding hospitals had an ethics committee. TASK FoRCE, supra note 24, at 17.
Another survey revealed 91% of non-federal Maryland hospitals and 78% of District of Columbia
hospitals had committees. Sims-Taylor, supra note 23, at 360 n.160.
128. TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 17.
129. Wolf, supra note 122, at 798-801. See also Services and Treatment for Disabled Infants;
Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Review Committees, 50 Fed. Reg.
14893, 14893 (1985) (encouraging the formation of "Infant Care Review Committees" in making health
care decisions for disabled infants); COMM'N REPORT, supra note 18, at 169 (recommending the
establishment of ethics committees). Such influential groups as the AMA and the American Academy
of Pediatrics have also endorsed the formation of ethics committees. Andrew L. Merritt, Tort Liability
of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1987).
130. TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 18.
131. Id. a 139.
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members include lawyers, clergy, and hospital administrators. 32 In long-term
member should be an advocate for the elderly or
care facilities, the community
133
persons in long-term care.
The interdisciplinary nature of the committee represents an advantage over
the judicial forum for review of health care decisions.' 34 Physicians and nurses
have clinical expertise to weigh medical facts as well as risks and benefits of
proposed treatment options. 35 Members of the community are more likely to
reflect the values of the patient. 36 Social workers may clarify issues regarding
community resources available to assist the patient and their family. 37 Members
of the clergy may assist committee members to identify religious and ethical issues
crucial to some patients. 38 Thus, the multidisciplinary committee can bring a
dimension of knowledgeable, reasoned decisionmaking to their determinations
beyond the scope of a judicial proceeding and may provide a forum more
amenable to ethical reflection and creative dispute resolution.
The multidisciplinary nature of the committee may also encourage parties to
seek assistance with difficult decisionmaking. 39 For example, a physician may
feel more comfortable consulting with another physician, or a nurse may be less
reluctant to bring her ethical concerns to another nurse, or a lay person may feel
less intimidated discussing his/her problems with another lay person. 40 To all
parties, a committee meeting within the health care facility itself may seem less
formidable and more accessible than a courtroom proceeding.
Though ethics committees may be relatively better decisionmakers than the
courts, the current committees include disadvantages.' 4' The majority of
committee members associate with the health care institution which may produce
a danger that committees will act as mere "puppets" of the facility.'42 In
addition, though ethics committees represent a multidisciplinary group, the
members remain largely homogenous. '41 Members typically are white, middle
or upper middle class with undergraduate, if not, graduate degrees.'" This
group may not accurately reflect the preferences of the community whom they

132. Id at 143-44.
133. Id. at 142.
134. Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 785.
135. Id See also TASK FoRMcE supra note 24, at 140.
136. Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 785.
137. TASK FORCE, supranote 24, at 140.
138. Id.at 140-41.
139. See Michael D. Swenson, M.D., Ph.D. & Ronald B. Miller, Ethics Case Review in Health
Care Institutions:Committees, Consultantsor Teams?, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MEm. 694,695 (1992)
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of consultants and committees).
140. See, eg., id
141. Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 785.
142. Id
143. Id. at 797 rL 158 (citing Diane E. Hoffinann, Does Legislating HospitalEthics Committees
Make a Difference?: A Study of HospitalEthics in Maryland,the Districtof Columbia, and Virginia,
19 LAW, MEDIcmIE & HEALTH CARE 105 (1991)).
144. Id.
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purport to represent. For example, studies show that non-college graduates,
African-Americans, born-again Christians, and the elderly are slightly more likely
145
than the general public to believe that a person's life should always be saved.
Therefore, recommendations for membership, such as those by the New York Task
Force, may be too narrow in scope to achieve their stated goal of producing a
committee that reflects the values of the community.
3. Functions of Ethics Committees
Currently committees perform a variety of functions within the health care
institution. The American Hospital Association Management Advisory has
suggested that certain activities are especially suited to ethics committees:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

directing educational programs;
providing a forum for discussing ethical issues;
formulating policy regarding ethical issues;
conducting retrospective review of "bedside" ethical decisions;
case consultation and providing a forum for dispute resolution.'46

functions of the committee is the review
Indeed, one of the most powerful
47
and formulation of hospital policy.'
The ethics committee role as a neutral third party in resolving disputes and
assisting parties to make health care decisions is the most controversial and,
potentially, most important role of the ethics committee.'48
C. Dispute Resolution
There are several advantages to utilizing alternative dispute resolution
techniques when deciding the treatment of patients who currently lack the capacity
to decide for themselves. Alternative dispute resolution includes processes such
as mediation, arbitration, negotiation and numerous hybrid forms. 49 These
processes provide several advantages over judicial intervention including:
1. maintaining and strengthening ongoing relationships;
2. expertise of the third party neutral in the subject of the dispute;

145. Id. (citing TIMES MIRROR CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, REFLECTIONS OF THE
TIMES: TBE RICr TO DIE 12 (1990)). See also Leslie J. Blackball et al., Ethnicily and Attitudes
Toward PatientAutonomy, 274 JAMA 820 (1995) (in many cultures, it is believed that the family, not
the patient, should make decisions regarding life support for the terminally ill).
146. Sims-Taylor, supra note 23, at 344 (citing AMERICAN HOSPTrAL ASSOCIATION,
MANAGEMENT ADVISORY: ETHIcs COMM1TrEES (1990)).
147. See Swenson, supra note 139, at 695.
148. See Merritt, supra note 129, at 1243-44 (recognizing the consultive role of an ethics
committee).
149. Fentiman, supra note 1, at 843.
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a sharing of views with the other side;
increased satisfaction with the decisionmaking process;
efficiency;
accessibility;
decreased cost;
confidentiality. 50

The use of alternative dispute resolution in health care decisionmaking for the
person who cannot decide for himself has the potential to facilitate a continuing
relationship between the parties, increase satisfaction of the parties with the
decision reached, protect the privacy of the patient and his family, and assist the
loved ones of a hopelessly ill patient to be at peace with the decision to withhold
or withdraw life prolonging treatment."' A timely and economically efficient
resolution of these problems may be a humane alternative to judicial intervention
for families already emotionally and fiscally exhausted.
1. Committees or Consultants
Currently two methods of case review utilizing alternative dispute resolution
An ethics
have been proposed: ethics committees and ethics consultants.'
consultant is an individual with specialized experience that enables him to identify
ethical issues and offer recommendations to health care practitioners based on
A consultant not only "clarifies issues, but solves
moral principles. '
cases."' 54 Most consultants utilize mediation or negotiation in resolving disputes
if called upon to do so.' 55 Many consultants place classified advertisements in
medical journals, offering their services."' Ethics consultants may be clinical
specialists who actually make rounds, review medical records and are otherwise
These clinicians then
regularly involved with the patient at the bedside.'
document their recommendations in the patient's medical record.'58 Other
consultants never see the patient, but make a detached recommendation to the
attending physician about proposed treatment options. "9

150. See id.
at 843-44, 846.
151. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
152. John Lapuma & Stephen E. Toumlin, Ethics Consultants and Ethics Committees, 149
AXiCHVES INTERNAL MED. 1109 (1989).
153. Id.
154. Id.This presupposes that there is, actually, a correct answer. However, a recent survey of
ethical consultants demonstrated wide variability in their recommendations in several hypothetical
vignettes. Ellen Fox & Carol Stocking, Ethics Consultants' Recommendationsfor Life-Prolonging
Treatment of Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State, 270 JAMA 2578 (1993).
155.
Id at 1110.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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The following are several advantages associated with an ethical consultant in
relation to an ethics committee:
1. it is easier to call in one person than it is to convene a committee:
2. the clinical consultant can gather evidence first hand to facilitate
decisionmaking;
3. the family and practitioner may be more relaxed speaking to an individual
than to a committee;
4. an individual may be more likely to consider creative alternatives than a
committee.16 °
The disadvantages of consultants favor utilizing the services of an ethics
committee. The following list highlights the disadvantages of ethical consultants:
1. the multidisciplinary membership of the committee is more likely to
reflect the values of the community;
2. the committee has the power to change hospital policy, if necessary, to
facilitate decisionmaldng;
3. moral and ethical discourse is more appropriately placed in a committee
reflecting various disciplines and attitudes within society;
4. ethics committees are already in place in most hospitals;
5. ethical consultants will cost money, therefore allowing consultant review
only for those families who can afford their services. 6"
2. Proposed Models of Dispute Resolution
At least one commentator has proposed a hybrid approach to the
consultation/committee dilemma.' 62 When a seriously ill patient is admitted to
the facility, a hospital counselor or case-managerwill approach the family to offer
the hospital's understanding and support. 63 This representative would offer
information relating to the ethics committee's counseling, advice and mediation
services. " The representative would continue to visit the patient and his family
and consult with members of the health care team to identify early conflicts and,
sometimes literally, mediate disputes at the bedside. 65 If these informal
mediation techniques fail, both parties are invited to resolve their conflicts at a
formal mediation session utilizing a different member of the ethics committee.'"
In those cases where successful mediation of the dispute is not achieved, the

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Swenson, supra note 139, at 695.
Id.
Sims-Taylor, supra note 23, at 348.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
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19961

67
The
dispute is then submitted to arbitration by the ethics committee.
likely
the
reflect
arbitration would not be binding, but would be intended to

of the issues.'" The costs of the process
outcome of a judicial determination
169

would be paid by the hospital.
At least one hospital has reported successful utilization of the hybrid

approach. 7 '

Detroit Receiving Hospital in Detroit, Michigan, maintains a

Comprehensive Support Care Team whose function is to offer a "comprehensive,

holistic and multidisciplinary approach" to patients and their families as they face
difficult end-of-life decisions."' Members of the team, led by a clinical nurse

specialist, accept referrals from physicians and other members of the health care
Members of the team then make rounds, gather data concerning
team.'
patients' prognosis and any information concerningthe patients' known wishes and
advance directives, meet with patients and their families and seek to address their
concerns and identify any areas of potential conflict.' 73 Most disputes are
resolved informally at the bedside. 74 In the event a decision cannot be reached
The clinical
in this manner, it is referred to the hospital ethics committee.'
76
committee.
the
ethics
co-chairs
also
team
the
heads
who
nurse specialist
Because of the priority this hospital gives to this group of patients, staff members
express an understanding that facilitating a satisfactory end to life can be as
important as saving a life.' 77
The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law has proposed a system
of dispute resolution utilizing hospital based ethics committees. 7 ' Every
hospital and long-term care facility would be required to establish an ethics
committee.'79 The committee would mediate disputes and make health care
In most cases, their findings would be nonbinding.''
determinations.'
However, committee decisions regarding withdrawal of life support from patients
without a surrogate or in cases where a patient without capacity is neither
s
permanently unconscious nor terminally ill, would be binding on the parties."

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id
Michael Villaire, MargaretL Campbell: Making an End-of-Life Difference, 14 CRMCAL

CARE NURSE 111 (1994).

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at261-65.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
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All decisions of the committee are reviewable by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
D. ProceduralSafeguards
Because the consequences of erroneous decisionmaking are critical and
because the patient has a constitutional right to make his own health care
decisions, certainprocedural safeguards must be in place before alternative dispute
resolution can replace the judicial process as a forum for deciding health care
issues."
1. Education
It is imperative that members of ethics committees, with the power to
mediate and/or decide health care disputes, be familiar with the components of a
reasoned analysis of the issues.' 85 Quality decisions and uniformity of the
decisionmaking process will be facilitated by educating members of ethics
committees in the principles of "substitute judgment" and "best interests" analysis.
The members of the committee should be aware of the prognosis and legal
implications of certain disease states. 8" The members must also possess an
awareness of and respect for the right of a patient to refuse any treatment, even
if to do so will cost the patient her life. The committee should, therefore, refuse
to mandate any treatment for which there exists clear and convincing evidencethat
the patient would refuse the treatment if able to do so." 8
2. Due Process
Disputes between caregivers and patient's families resolved by arbitration
must contain procedural safeguards to ensure the due process rights of the
Wolf has described the current process of dispute resolution by ethics
parties.
committees as a "due process wasteland."'" 4 Often, committees meet at the
request of the physician without any awareness by the patient or her family that
the case is being reviewed." 9 The proposed model of dispute resolution in New
York provides procedural safeguards which protect the parties' due process rights:
The committee shall provide the patient or his surrogate with

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.at 267.
See id. at 27-28; see also Lee et al., supra note 2, at 1359.
Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 768.
Id.
TASK FORCE, supra note 24, at 82.
Wolf,supra note 122, at 819.
Id.
Id.
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(i) notice of any pending case consideration concerning the
patient... and;
(ii) the committee's response to the case, including a written
statement of the reasons for approving or disapproving the
withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment... 191
3. Immunity

To promote the use of ethics committees in dispute resolution, members of
the committee and health care professionals who follow the decisions of the
committee must be immune from liability."g Fear of liability would not only
discourage membership on the committee but would also limit free and open
discussion by the parties involved in the decisionmaking process. 93 The New
York proposal contains a qualified immunity provision. 94 All parties to the
decisionmakingprocess including members, providers and surrogates are immune
from all civil and criminal liability, providing they acted in good faith.' 95 For
example, deciding to limit life support based on the institution's fiscal concerns
is considered acting in bad faith.'96
4. Judicial Review
The role of the committee is to provide a decisional process that is efficient,
accessible, reasoned and protective of the patient's rights. 1 ' Decisions of ethics
committees should still remain appealable to the courts.' Review by the courts
will ensure that the committees are acting in good faith with adequate due process
rights in place.' 99 Hoffmann has proposed that courts should review these
decisions only if the committee failed to follow appropriateprocedure in rendering
their decision and overturn the committee's decision only if arbitrary and
capricious. 2" Conversely, Wolf believes that all judicial review should be "de
novo. 120 1 The proposed New York scheme would allow any party to turn to a
court of competent jurisdiction at any time for an order to terminate or institute
treatment.20 2 Because this is a life and death decision, any restriction of judicial
review would be unwise. However, if the committee follows competent

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

TASK FoRCE, supra note 24, at 264.

Merritt, supra note 129, at 1251.
TASK FoRcE, supra note 24, at 150.
Id. at 266.
Id
Id. at 150.
Wolf, supra note 122, at 852.
Hoffmann, supra note 66, at 795.
Id.
Id
Id
TASK FORC, supra note 24, at 267.
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decisionmaking procedures, their decisions should closely mirror any judicial
determination.

V.

CONCLUSION

Advancements in medical technology have given birth to disputes regarding
the withholding of life-sustaining treatments. It is well established that a nonpregnant adult has a right to refuse any treatment, even if refusal will result in the
person's death. Problems arise when a patient lacks the capacity to make health
decisions for herself and has failed to execute an advance directive regarding her
care. It then becomes necessary for someone else to decide for the patient. These
decisions are frequently made at the bedside by the patient's family and physician.
Unfortunately, when they cannot agree, the parties are forced to resort to judicial
determination of these sensitive issues. Various commentators have suggested that
these types of decisions are better made in a hospital ethics committee using
alternative dispute models such as arbitration and/or mediation.
ADR would offer several advantages over the judicial process in resolving
these disputes including accessibility, low cost, expertise of the members,
confidentiality and allowing a continued relationship between the parties. To
protect the rights of the patient, however, concepts of due process and reasoned
decisionmaking must be part of the process. Judicial review of the decision should
be available to ensure integrity of the decisionmaking body.
Reasoned decisionmaking with respect for the autonomy of the patient and
compassion for his suffering tempered by value for his life should guide all bodies
and/or individuals called upon to decide for a seriously ill person who can no
longer decide for himself. Mediation and arbitration may offer an alternative form
of dispute resolution most likely to achieve these ideals.
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